Realisms Interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti;

Realisms Interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti;

Author:Arindam Chakrabarti;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK


15


Fictionalism about the Mental

Introduction: What exactly is fictionalism about the mind?

Physicalists who believe that our talk of persons, sensations, emotions, beliefs, desires, consciousness, etc., is convenient fiction sometimes appear to tolerate folk psychological claims. While neuro-physiological discourse states hard facts, their argument goes, ordinary first- or second-person consciousness attributions deserve “soft” or “as if” truth-status. In Mādhyamika Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta, there is a long tradition of metaphysical double talk, which serves to distinguish between levels. The Mādhyamika Buddhist asserts the existence of permanent selves carrying the imprints of past actions and desires from one life to the next life as an empirical, ethically important, transactional truth, but admits no such self at the level of ultimate truth. Candrakīrti, the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika commentator on Nāgārjuna, similarly asserts the ontological status of physical objects, albeit only at the transactional empirical level.1 Yet, this assertion of direct realism about physical objects is, in the ultimate analysis, a kind of fiction.

My aim is to show how fictionalism about the mental (FM) is imperiled by insincerity and self-refutation. If appearance-talk is mind-talk, then the fictionalist cannot deny the existence of mental states, attitudes, dispositions, and events by diagnosing all thinking as merely appearing to think. His denial would then be also inside the folk-psychological fiction, since neurons cannot deny or accept, or appear to deny or accept, anything. His denial would be merely a set of occurrences and dispositions of his brain. If a realist (anti-fictionalist) about mental events tries to point out the contradiction in maintaining

1. that thinking is nothing but neural activity,

2. thinking is fiction, but

3. neural activity is not fiction,

then the fictionalist could respond as follows: the inconsistency disappears if we rephrase (2) as “thinking, as anything distinct from neural activity, is fiction.”

A nominalist tolerates our discourse about common properties, but only as a conventional “manner of speaking.” The innocuous reference to time in the oft-uttered sentence “My time is valuable” does not commit the busy man to the existence of Time as a separate metaphysical category. Those who do not believe that abstract numbers exist over and above concrete collections of as many objects might still speak of numbers. Another common type of utterance could be perfectly literal but not used for stating facts. When we “speak of” Sherlock Holmes as an addict, we need not believe in his existence. There is yet a third way, besides metaphor and fiction, in which we can speak of things we do not believe exist: reporting of other beliefs. A modern social scientist who has no belief in souls could state that the Christian soul is not reborn like the Hindu soul.

With respect to philosophy of mind, the fictionalist either descriptively diagnoses our first-person introspective reports or qualia-ascriptions to others as “really” figurative, ontologically non-committal utterances, or prescriptively recommends the revision of our ontological commitments such that we treat all mind-talk with meta-metaphysical levity.

FM faces a destructive dilemma. It either fails as a translation of folk-psychological sentences about first- or second-person mental events,



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